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Calugar: Assumption of Liabilities in "C" Reorganizations

ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITIES IN "C" REORGANIZATIONS
INTRODUCTION

Section 368(a)(1)(C)' permits an acquiring corporation to assume or acquire 2
liabilities of an acquired corporation in pursuance of a "C" reorganization. To
come within the section 368(a)(1)(C) license, the statutory prerequisite is that
the liability assumed constitute a liability of "the other" corporation.3 The
apparent simplicity of this foundational requirement has, as the result of
judicial interpretation, become a matter of considerable uncertainty. The
objectives of this paper are twofold - to describe the present status of the law
regarding assumption of liabilities in "C" reorganizations in order to assist the
practitioner who must deal with the law as it now is, and to suggest a statutory
solution to the current state of affairs.
BACKGROUND

The event defined under current law as a "C" reorganization was originally
described in the Revenue Act of 1921, section 202(c)(2) which provided, that
"the word 'reorganization' . . . includes a merger or consolidation (including
the acquisition by one corporation . . . of substantially all the properties of

another corporation)." 4 As originally drafted, the assumption of liabilities was
clearly permitted. The original legislation also literally included as a reorganization an acquisition solely for cash or securities; an incredible oversight that
gave rise to the development of the judically imposed requirement of continuity of interest.5
1. I.R.C. §568(a)(1)(C).
2. With the exception of the discussion in note 19 infra, the term assumption of a liability
when used in this note is intended to include acquisition of property subject to liabilities that
are not assumed.
3. See Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 199, 1942-1 U.S.T.C. 19248
(1942).
4. Revenue Act of 1921, §202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 230.
5. The continuity of interest requirement embodies the raison d'etre for providing nonrecognition in reorganization exchanges. It is only when the interest of the acquired corporation's shareholders is continued as a shareholder interest in the acquiring corporation that
nonrecognition of gain realized in the exchange can be justified by characterizing the transaction as a continuation of the original investment in a different form. To effective this
policy the Supreme Court, prior to the statutory adoption of continuity of interest in the
1934 Act, held that the acquired corporation's shareholders "must acquire an interest in the
affairs of the purchasing company." Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S.
462, 470, 3 U.S.T.C. 11023 (1933). Subsequent to the 1934 amendment the Court expanded
upon the position taken in Pinellas by adding that the "interest" in the acquiring corporation
must be "definite and material; it must represent a substantial part of the value of the thing
transferred." Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378, 385, 1936-1 U.S.T.C. 19015 (1936).
A further refinement of the continuity requirement came with the Supreme Court's announcement that an equity interest must be acquired in the acquiring corporation since the Court
determined that an acquiring corporation's bonds do not constitute a sufficient proprietary
stake in the enterprise. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 1940-1 U.S,T.C. U9150 (1940).
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As part of the Revenue Act of 1934, Congress sought to correct this oversight
by rewriting the definition of "reorganization" and imposing a statutory continuity of interest requirement. This revision, section 112(g)(1)(B), provided,
"The term 'reorganization' means ... (B) the acquisition by one corporation
in exchange solely for all or part of its voting stock

. . .

of substantially all the

properties of another corporation.'' 6 The new statutory requirement was interpreted as codifying, in stricter terms, 7 the judicial doctrine of continuity of
interest, and it was assumed 8 by both taxpayers and the Commissioner that
assumption of the acquired corporation's liabilities, though not specifically
authorized, was contemplated by the statute. 9 In United States v. Hendler,10
however, the Supreme Court announced that this interpretation was erroneous,
and that assumption of the acquired corporation's liabilities would prevent the
transaction from qualifying as a reorganization.
The effect of Hendler was not only to require litigation of gains and basis
provisions of past years reorganizations but also, on a practical level, to foreclose the use of stock for asset reorganizations, inasmuch as the transfer of
liabilities is a normal incident to the acquisition of a going concern." In re6. Revenue Act of 1934, §l12(g)(1)(B), 48 Stat. 705. The original reorganization definition
- §202(c)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1921 - in failing to define any consideration requirements
created by default a situation in which all reorganizations had the same consideration constraints - namely the general continuity of interest requirement imposed by Pinellas. See
note 5 supra. This "uniform" treatment of consideration was dicotomized by §112(g)(1)(B) of
the 1934 Act, which imposed a strict continuity of interest restriction upon "B" and "C" reorganizations but was silent as to the consideration requirements applicable to "A" reorganizations. The "A" reorganization as a result remained a product of state law and federal judicial
construction.
Since the operative consequences flowing from characterization as "A", "B", or "C" reorganizations are identical the disparate treatment of consideration precipitated by the 1934
Act and continuing until the present is difficult to justify on a policy basis. It might be that
since Congress created the "B" and "C" form of reorganization as an alternative to state
statutory mergers and consolidations it felt obliged to provide federal consideration requirements for the "B" and "C" forms while allowing the nature of consideration in "A" reorganizations to be developed by state law. See text accompanying notes 106-117 infra. If this
was in fact the congressional reasoning in 1934, subsequent history has proved reliance on
state requirements to be wholly illusory since state corporate law has consistently permitted
the use of any form of consideration acceptable to the required percentage of voting shareholders. See A.B.A.-A.L.I. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr. (2d ed. 1970). Section 71(b) of the Model Act
gives the board of directors complete discretion in setting the terms of exchange in a merger or
consolidation. Section 71(c) authorizes the consideration of the acquiring corporation to consist
of "shares, obligations or other securities of the surviving corporation or of any other corporation or, in whole or in part, into cash or other property." Section 73 provides that such terms
will become effective upon approval by the majority vote of the shareholders of the corporations that are parties to the merger or consolidation.
7. The judicially created continuity of interest doctrine always permitted the consideration of the acquiring corporation to include some boot. See note 5 supra.
8. See note 12 infra.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1939).
10. 303 U.S. 564, 1938-1 U.S.T.C. 19215 (1938).
11. See H.R. REp. No. 855, 76th Cong., IstSess. 18 (1939), in which the committee noted
that "[iun typical transactions changing the form or entity of a business it is not customary to
liquidate the liabilities of the business and such liabilities are almost invarably assumed by
the corporation which continues the business."
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sponse to the unsettling consequences of Hendler, both taxpayers and the
Service pressed for a legislative solution. 2 Congress responded the year following the Hendler decision by adding with retroactive effect 13 to the definition of
an asset for stock reorganization that, "in determining whether the exchange is
solely for voting stock the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, or the fact that property is acquired subject to a liability shall
be disregarded."' 4
The Supreme Court considered the effect of the 1939 revision in Helvering
v. Southwest Consolidated Corp.'5 In Southwest, a new corporation through
the medium of a bondholder's committee1 6 acquired substantially all the assets
of its insolvent predecessor. The consideration given by the new corporation
consisted of, new common voting stock, option warrants to purchase common
voting stock, and the assumption of the liability to repay a loan that had been
incurred in pursuance of the plan of reorganization, and the proceeds of which
were used to discharge the obligation to nonparticipating bondholders of the
old corporation who were paid twenty-three percent of the face value of their
old bonds.Y7 The Court determined that the new corporation's assumption of
the obligation to repay the bank loan was not the assumption of an obligation
of the old corporation within the scope of the 1939 amendment. Accordingly,
it held that the transaction would not qualify as a "C" reorganization because
the solely for voting stock restriction had been violated.18 The Court justified
its position noting that,
The requirement to pay cash arose out of the reorganization itself. It
derived, as did the requirement to pay stock, from the plan pursuant to
12. The committee reports considering legislation correcting the result in Hendler
acknowledged that the decision, by abrogating the assumed permissibility of assumption of
liabilities, imposed a hardship upon taxpayers and the Treasury, stating that "these two
corrections are emergency maters and if they are not incorporated in the present bill
thousands of people will pay penalties that they could not have anticipated by any line of
reasoning, and in many cases the Treasury itself will suffer a definite loss of revenue." S. REP.
No. 648, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1939). See text accompanying notes 86-95 infra.
13. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §213(f), 53 Stat. 871.
14. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §112(g)(1)(B), 53 Stat. 40.
15. 315 U.S. 194, 1942-1 U.S.T.C. 19248 (1942).
16. See Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 1942-1 U.S.T.C.
19245 (1942), holding that the continuity of interest xequirement is satisfied when the creditors
of an insolvent corporation acquire the entire proprietary interest in the successor corporation
since the old corporation's insolvency had placed the creditors in effective command.
17. 315 U.S. at 197-98.
18. The use of warrants was also held to violate the solely for voting stock requirement.
Id. at 200-01. While the acquiring corporation may not issue its own warrants as consideration
for the assets of the acquired corporation, the Service has ruled that the acquiring corporation

may substitute its own stock for the outstanding and unexercised warrants and employee stock
options held by the acquired corporation's shareholders. Rev. Rul. 68-637, 1968-2 C.B. 158.

Since the acquired corporation's options and warrants represent a contractual obligation of the
acquired corporation to issue shares on predetermined conditions the ruling held that the

undertaking by the acquiring corporation to discharge these contracts with its own shares
constituted an assumption of a liability of the acquired corporation within the meaning of
§368(a)(1)(C).
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which the properties were acquired. It was a necessary indicent of the
court decree which wiped out the liability of the old corporation and
substituted another one in its place. Though the liability assumed had
its origin in obligations of the transferor, its nature and amount were determined and fixed in the reorganization.It therefore cannot be labelled
as an obligation of the 'other' or predecessor corporation within the
meaning of the 1939 amendment. 19
Confined to its facts, Southwest involved the assumption of an obligation to
a third party that was not an obligee of the acquired corporation prior to the
consummation of the plan of reorganization. The language of the opinion was
far broader, encompassing any obligation the nature and amount of which were
"determined and fixed in the reorganization." This overbreadth left unanswered the extent to which an existing obligation could be modified before
it ceased to qualify as an obligation of the acquired corporation.
The Court in Southwest acknowledged that the 1939 code, by specifically
permitting assumption of obligations, reversed the result in the Hendler decision.20 The Court however distingiushed Southwest stating that Hendler,
dealt with a situation where an indebtedness which antedated that transaction in question was assumed by the transferee. There the debt assumed clearly was a 'liability of the other' corporation .... We search
the legislative history of the 1939 amendment in vain for any indication
that it was designed to do more than to alter the rule of the Hendler
case.2'
19. 315 U.S. at 200 (emphasis added). I.R.C. §368(a)(l)(C) permits the carryover of two
kinds of liabilities: "(I) assumptions by the acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, or
(2) the fact that property acquired is subject to a liability, shall be disregarded ....
(emphasis
added _" Southwest, dealing with this first kind, narrowly construes liabilities "of the other"
corporation so that modification of an assumed liability effected in pursuance of the plan of
reorganization may result in such liability being treated as not having originated with the
"other" acquired corporation and consequently not "assumed" within the statutory license.
If the modified liabilities, rather than being assumed, are liabilities of the acquired corporation encumbering its assets and such assets are taken subject to such liabilities, then the
transaction would avoid the statutory requirement that assumed liabilities be "of the other"
corporation. Literally, Southwest would be avoided since it is a technical application of this
"the other" requirement that the Southwest decision regarding assumed liabilities turns upon.
Interestingly the Southwest Court recognized that its interpretation might treat acquired
liabilities differently than assumed liabilities. However, the Court merely noted that the
liabilities in the case at bar were assumed rather than acquired subject to, and did not consider whether the result would have been different had the new corporation only acquired
property subject to modified liabilities: "Nor can the property be said to have been acquired
'subject to' that liability within the purview of that amendment. The words 'subject to'
normally connote, in legal parlance, an absence of personal obligation. That seems to be the
case here, for the preceding clause of the amendment covers the case of 'assumption'." 315
U.S. at 200.
Although lower court treatment of Southwest has not distinguished assumed and acquired
liabilities, the fact that the Southwest syllogism falls down with respect to liabilities that are
acquired rather than assumed is a further indication that Congress in enacting the 1939
amendment did not intend to create the result engendered by the Southwest interpretation.
20. Id. at 199.
21. Id.
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It follows that a modification of an obligation that goes no further than the
facts in Hendler should be considered outside of the reach of Southwest. Closer
scrutiny of the Hendler facts therefore seems appropriate.
Examination of the facts in Hendler reveals that three significant modifications of the liabilities there involved were made as part of a written plan of
reorganization adopted jointly by the acquired and acquiring corporations. The
Hendler plan of reorganization required the acquired corporation to call its
bonds for redemption.22 Under the terms of the bond indenture the call gave
rise to a seven and one-half percent premium above the face value of the
bonds Furthermore, the plan required the acquired corporation to borrow
funds to pay the redemption and premium price with the provision that the
acquiring corporation would assume the liability to repay this loan. 24 The
modifications of liabilities that were fixed by the Hendler plan of reorganization therefore had the effect of, accelerating the normal due date of the liability, changing the amount required to discharge the liability, and creating a
new obligee. Pursuant to the reorganization agreement, the acquired corporation called its bonds, but the loan contemplated by the agreement was never
consummated due to the fact that the date ultimately established for the exchange preceeded the redemption date of the bonds and as a result the acquiring corporation paid the acquired corporation's bondholders six days following
the reorganization, rather than making payment to a bank.25 However, in view
of the Court's repeated emphasis upon the substance of the transaction in reorganization situations,26 it would seem incredible that the same decision in
Hendlerwould have been reached after the 1939 amendments had the reorganization taken place a week later with the acquiring corporation discharging the
acquired corporation's loan rather than paying its bondholders.
The nature of the modification of liabilities in Hendler was not considered
in the Hendler Court's opinion,27 no doubt due to the fact that the Hendler
decision held any assumption of a liability to be fatal. If the Southwest Court
recognized the similarity of the types of modifications in these cases it failed to
acknowledge this recognition in its opinion. Analysis of the facts however indicates that the real distinction between the cases is not the types of modifica22. Record on appeal, 12, United States v. Hendler, 803 U.S. 564, 1938-1 U.S.T.C. 9215
(1938).
23. United States v. Hendler, 91 F.2d 680, 681, 1987-2 U.S.T.C. f9448 (4th Cir. 1987).
24. Hendler v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 558, 563-64, 1987-1 U.S.T.C. ff9028 (D. Md.
1987), reu'd, 803 U.S. 564 (1988).
25. Id. at 564. The district court observed "[i]f the closing date had actually been after
July Ist, the bonds would have been retired but the liabilities assumed by [the acquiring
corporation] increased by the cost thereof."
26. See Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194, 200, 1942-1 U.S.T.C. f9248
(1942), in which the Court, quoting Alabama Asphaltic, states, "we regarded the several steps
in a reorganization as mere 'intermediate procedural devices utilized to enable the new
corporation to acquire all the assets of the old one pursuant to a single reorganization plan.' ""
Accord, Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 1938-1 U.S.T.C. 9050 (1988); Gregory
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70, 1935-1 U.S.T.C. 9043 (1935).
27. The nature of the modifications of liabilities in Hendler was reflected in the record
on appeal and lower court opinions, but was not considered in the Supreme Court's Hendler
opinion. See notes 22-24 supra.
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tions of liabilities but rather that the degree28 of such modifications was more
drastic in Southwest.29.
Congress unmistakably intended the 1939 amendments to qualify a Hendler
type transaction.3o Viewing the types of modifications of liabilities in the
Hendler reorganization with this premise in mind makes interpretation of
Southwest's proscription of transactions by which the nature and amount of
liabilities are determined and fixed an arduous task. Analysis of the lower
courts' application of Southwest confirms this difficulty.
SOUTHWEST'S PROGENY

The cases considering modification of liabilities under the Southwest decision can be grouped within two primary classes - those in which the principal

amount of the obligation remains the same, and those in which the principal
amount is changed. A minority of cases evade this dichotomy and will be considered separately.
PrincipalAmount is Unchanged, Transfers of Cash
In Stockton HarborIndustrial Co. v. Commissioner,31 the acquired corporation transferred substantially all of its assets and liabilities to a new corporation
in exchange for new voting stock and cash. The new corporation contended
that it had acquired the old corporation's assets by purchase giving rise to a
stepped up cost basis, while the Commissioner asserted that the acquisition was
by way of a "C" reorganization resulting in a carryover basis in the acquired
assets. The Ninth Circuit, affirming the Tax Court, held that a valid "C" reorganization had occurred since the cash transferred by the acquiring corporation was delivered to an escrow under terms requiring its distribution to
satisfy outstanding liabilities of the acquired corporation.- 2 Although the resolution under which the exchange was made recited the consideration of the
acquiring corporation to be both cash and its voting stock,3 3 the court, looking
to the substance of the transaction, treated the cash payment as an assumption
of the old corporation's liabilities. The test used by the court was that, "when
28. In distinguishing Southwest from Hendler the Court did note that the degree of
change was more substantial in Southwest. "The situation here is quite different. The rights
of security holders against the old corporation were drastically

altered by the sale made

pursuant to the plan." 315 U.S. at 199.
29. In Southwest old bondholders received only 24% of the face value of their bonds,
whereas the change in Hendler was only 7 1/2%. Also significant is that the acquired corporation in Hendler had the legal right apart from the reorganization to call its bonds for redemption thereby altering the date and amount of payment.
30. See S. REP. No. 648, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1939).
31. 216 F.2d 638, 1954-2 U.S.T.C. 9664 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 904 (1955).
32. The letter of instruction to the escrow provided that if any surplus remained after
payment of designated obligations of the old corporation, such surplus would be returned to
the new corporation. 216 F.2d at 643. As a result, the terms of the agreement effectively prevented the old corporation from receiving cash not used to discharge its liabilities. Such a
provision seems a wise practice to prevent an unintended payment of boot that might disqualify the "C" reorganization by reason of I.R.C. §368(a)(2)(B).
33. 216 F.2d at 642.
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the nature and amount of a debt arising from a pre-existing obligation are
determined and fixed prior to the reorganization, the payment of cash to liquidate it is treated as a payment on a liability assumed."3 4 Under this test the
obligation itself must exist and its amount must be fixed prior to and therefore
apart from the reorganization. Furthermore, the Stockton court indicated that
the test would be the same regardless of the source of the obligation or status of
the obligee, so that,
whether we are dealing with (1) stockholders or bondholders who do not
consent to reorganization, (2) creditors who have unliquidated claims,
the nature and extent of which were not definitely determined until the
reorganization, or (8) debts incurred as expenses of reorganization, 5 we
are dealing with liabilities which, in the language of Helvering v.
Southwest Consol. Corporation,supra, although they had their "origin
in obligations of the transferor, their nature and amount were determined and fixed in the reorganization."3 6
PrincipalAmount is Unchanged,Substitution of Bonds
The Board of Tax Appeals held in an early case that the substitution of
bonds of the new corporation for bonds of the old corporation would constitute
an assumption of the old corporation's obligations where the new corporation
"agreed to pay the [very same] amount of principal and interest owed by the
old company to the very same creditors, the holders of the old bonds."37 The
Tax Court added a significant extension to this rule in New Jersey Mortgage
& Title Co.,38 holding that the new corporation could substitute new for old
bonds of the same principal amount while- paying a lower interest rate
and extending the maturity date. 39 In deciding that changes in the interest
rate and date of maturity were "immaterial" the court announced that, "the
controlling fact is that the bonds of the new corporation were substituted for
the bonds of the old corporation in the exact amount of the principal of the
indebtedness." 40
PrincipalAmount is Unchanged,Changes in Security
The Second Circuit has held 4' that an exchange of an unsecured obligation
of the acquired corporation for a secured obligation of the acquiring corporation would not constitute the assumption of a liability of "the other" corporation. The court reasoned that providing security so changes the nature of the
34. Id. at 646.
55. The Treasury has now adopted the position that assumption of bona fide reorganization expenses does not violate Southwest. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
36. 216 F.2d at 649.
37. Harden F. Taylor, 43 B.T.A. 563, 567, aff'd, 128 F.2d 855, 1942-2 U.S.T.C. f19547 (2d
Cir. 1942).
38. 3 T.C. 1277 (1944).
39. Id. at 1288. The modification of the maturity date was stipulated to be an extension
of ten years.
40. Id.
41. Stoddard v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 76, 1944-1 U.S.T.C. 119223 (2d Cir. 1944).
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obligation as to prevent the treatment of the new obligation as an assumption
of the old. Although the new secured obligation had been scaled down to
twenty-six percent of the principal amount of the old42 the court held that the
provision of security violated Southwest. 43 As a result, under the Second
Circuit's approach, securing an acquired corporation's unsecured obligations
will run afoul of Southwest where the principal amount is unchanged.
44
The Second Circuit approach is apparently not shared by the Tax Court
and has not been considered in other circuits. Viewed from the perspective of
the Southwest decision, the provision of security constitutes a change in the
"nature" of the old corporation's obligations. On a practical level, the approach is justifiable in that if the acquiring corporation could secure the obligations of creditors dissenting to a plan of reorganizing a financially distressed
acquired corporation, the economic effect would be much the same as if the
acquiring corporation had paid the dissenters cash. The election to dissent in
such a plan of reorganization often represents an effort to reduce a claim to
certainty rather than relying on the fortunes of the new corporation to make
good the obligation of the old.
PrincipalAmount is Changed
In Louis E. Stoddard, Jr.,45 the taxpayer sought to deduct a loss in connec-

tion with the exchange of $101,111 of the old corporation's seven percent second
mortgage notes for $43,333 of four percent second mortgage notes of the new
corporation.46 The liability assumed by the new corporation to pay $43,333,

equalling forty-three percent of the face value of the old notes, had its origin in
the $101,111 obligation of the old corporation, but the nature and amount of
the obligation assumed by the new corporation were "determined and fixed" in
the reorganization, placing the transaction squarely within the facts of Southwest. Yet the Board of Tax Appeals in an opinion reviewed by the full board
agreed with the Commissioner that no loss could be recognized since the exchange was pursuant to a tax free "C" reorganization. 4 The Stoddard court,

employing an argument that completely sidestepped the Supreme Court's established test, distinguished Southwest in stating, "the issuance of the ...

sec-

42. Id. at 78.
43. Id. at 79.
44. The Board of Tax Appeals had held the transaction to constitute a reorganization,
Louis E. Stoddard, Jr., 47 B.T.A. 584 (1942), and the Tax Court has cited the opinion with
approval. Cf. Montgomery Bldg. Realty Co., 7 T.C. 417 (1946), in which the unsecured
creditors of the old corporation became unsecured creditors of the new corporation and in
addition acquired 100% of the new corporation's stock. The Tax Court held that the
transaction was a valid assumption within Southwest. From an economic standpoint, the
acquisition of complete ownership of the new corporation had an effect analogous to
securing the obligations to the extent of the unencumbered assets of the new corporation.
The Tax Court has also permitted the substitution of old bonds with new income bonds.
Southland Ice Co., 5 T.C. 842 (1945); New Jersey Mortgage 8:Title Co., 3 T.C. 1277 (1944).
45. 47 B.T.A. 584 (1942), rev'd, Stoddard v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 76, 1944-1 U.S.T.C.
19223 (2d Cir. 1944).
46. In an unrelated exchange a bank owed a $19,000 unsecured obligation received $5,000
second mortgage bonds. See text accompanying notes 49-50 infra.
47. Revenue Act of 1936, §112(g)(1)(B), 49 Stat. 1681 (now I.R.C. §368(a)(1)(C)).
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ond mortgage bonds in the case at bar .. constituted an assumption of indebtedness. The bonds were issued in recognition of the indebtedness of the old
corporation. The indebtedness antedated the reorganization and did not arise
out of

it."48

This interpretation would limit the application of Southwest to

where not only is the nature and amount "determined and fixed" by the plan of
reorganization but in addition the obligee did not exist prior to the reorganization.
The Stoddard decision-was reversed on appeal,49 but the Second Circuit's
opinion left the Board's change in principal amount construction of Southwest
intact, and actually supported such a construction by way of dicta. The cause
for reversal, which was unrelated to Stoddard's transaction, was an exchange of
$19,000 unsecured to obligations of the old corporation for $5,000 secured obligations of the new. The Second Circuit held that this assumption of a secured
obligation in exchange for an unsecured obligation violated Southwest, and
supported modification of the amount of the liability assumed by stating,
the debt of the old corporation was unsecured and an assumption of that
part of it which survived the reorganization would have been the assumption pro tanto of the same liability ....Instead of assuming that kind
of liability however, the acquiring corporation became liable on bonds
1o
secured by a second mortgage ....
Stoddardrepresented a conspicuous departure from prior interpretations of
Southwest in regard to modifications of the principal amount of an assumed
indebtedness. Only a month previous to its opinion in Stoddard the Board of
Tax Appeals had disqualified, on the authority of Southwest, an attempted "C"
reorganization in which the new corporation assumed the liability to pay twentyfour percent of the face value of old bondholders."" Furthermore, since its
rendition the Stoddard opinion has never been cited as authority for the proposition that an assumed liability may properly be scaled down in pursuance of a
"C" reorganization. Somewhat ironically, the Tax Court cited Stoddard to support the holding in New Jersey Mortgage & Title Co.52 that modifications of
interest and maturity dates of assumed obligations were permitted under
Southwest since, "the controlling fact is that the bonds of the new corporation
were substituted for the bonds of the old corporation in the exact amount of
the principal of the indebtedness.."53 In still another case, the Tax Court held
that payment by the new corporation of fifty percent of the face value of the
54
old corporation's bonds was, "in no sense an obligation of the old company."
48.
49.
50.
51.

47 B.T.A. at 589.
Stoddard v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d at 76, 1944-1 U.S.T.C. at 29223 (2d Cir. 1944).
Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
Sacramento Medico Dental Bldg. Co., 47 B.T.A. 315 (1942).

52. 3 T.C. 1277 (1944).
53. Id. at 1288.

54. Central Kansas Telephone Co., Inc., 1 T.C.M. 885, 887 (1943), aff'd, 141 F.2d 213,
1944-1 U.S.T.C. g9249 (10th Cir. 1944). The Central Kansas case is distinguished from
Stoddard in that the scaled down obligations in Central Kansas were retired immediately after
the reorganization whereas, in Stoddard, the obligations were retired at a maturity date ex-

tended by the plan of reorganization. It is clear that the date of retirement should have no
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Thus, although Stoddard's treatment of scaled down liabilities has not been
specifically overruled, it clearly represented a departure from the mainstream
interpretation of Southwest and did not provide a sound basis for planning.
Modification of PrincipalAmount When Creditors
Become Shareholders
When creditors of the acquired corporation surrender their claims and receive in exchange both scaled down obligations and voting stock of the acquiring corporation, an argument can be made that the consideration received may
be bifurcated. The transaction would therefore be treated as an assumption of
the acquired corporation's liability to the extent of the acquiring corporation's
obligation and an exchange of the remaining part of the liability of the
acquired corporation for voting stock of the acquiring corporation. Southwest
could be distinguished in such an exchange because to the extent that the
acquired corporation's liabilities are exchanged for stock there is no fixing of a
new liability, and the amount of the liability assumed would be traded dollar
for dollar for the residue not exchanged for stock. Clearly, a court could hold
that it is the reorganization that determines the amount of the residual liability
that is to be assumed, but such a transaction would at least provide a judge that
wished to distinguish Southwest a basis for doing so. Although this rationale has
not been specifically espoused, several decisions indicate that such a position
might be tacitly accepted by the Tax Court.
In Adwood Corp.,55 the assets of the old corporation were acquired in a
foreclosure by a lessor of the old corporation.56 Subsequently, the corporation
was the subject of an attempted "C" reorganization. In this acquisition the
lessor received both stock and a reduced obligation of the acquiring corporation. The Tax Court held that since the new corporation acquired assets from
the lessor rather than from the old corporation, the transaction would not
qualify as a reorganization.57 However by way of dicta the court stated that the
bearing on whether an obligation is treated as assumed. In United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S.
564 (1938), the obligations of the old corporation were retired six days after the reorganization, and the Court has acknowledged that the purpose and effect of the 1939 amendment was
to permit Hendler type assumptions in "C" reorganizations. See text accompanying notes 20-21
supra.
55. 15 T.C. 148, aff'd, 200 F.2d 552, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. 19140, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953).

56. The sole asset of the old corporation was a hotel situated on land of a lessor who had
foreclosed to recover arrears in rent. The bondholders of the old corporation, who were
secured by both the hotel and the land, attempted to sell the assets in liquidation but were
unable to locate a buyer. As a result, the property remained in the hands of the lessor who in
operating the hotel made substantial advances that were prior in right to the claims of the
bondholders. Id. at 152.
57. Since the assets of the old corporation were acquired from an individual, the lessor
of the land on which the old corporation's hotel had been built, the statutory requirement
that the acquisition of assets by the acquiring corporation be from the acquired corporation
was not met. I.R.C. §368(a)(l)(C). The Sixth Circuit held that since the lessor in foreclosing
for arrearages in rent was not acting on behalf of the creditors of an insolvent corporation,
the rule in Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone, 315 0.S. 179, 1942-1 U.S.T.C. 119245
(1942), would not apply. See note 16 supra. Adwood should be compared with the situation in
which the assets of an insolvent corporation are acquired by a creditors' committee acting on
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transaction may have qualified had the old corporation not lost its interest in
the acquired assets. 58 On appeal the Sixth Circuit 59 affirmed the Tax Court on
the merits but added that even if the old corporation were assumed to be the
transferor, the transaction would fail to qualify as a reorganization since the
"amount of the obligation [assumed] was not determined and fixed until the
plan of reorganization... was adopted."6 0
The Tax Court specifically demonstrated a willingness to bifurcate the
1
consideration of the acquiring corporation in Southland Ice Co.6 In Southland Ice, old bondholders received one fifty-dollar bond and one share of
new voting stock with a stated value of ten dollars for each $100 principal
amount of old bonds surrendered. 62 Although the amount of the old obligations
to be assumed by the new corporation was fixed by the plan of reorganization,
the court classified the substitution of debt as a permissible assumption of a
liability since the new corporation, "issued its income bonds in the amount of
50 percent of par value of the old bonds in order to assume that amount of the
6
bonded indebtedness of the old company and in substitution thereof." 3 It is
noteworthy that even though the new stock had a stated value of ten dollars,
the Tax Court still treated the exchange as being a "substitution" of fifty
dollars of old debt for fifty dollars of new debt. Whether the court would have
ruled differently had the equity interest acquired been de minimus is left to
speculation.
Finally, in Maine Steel Inc. v. United States,"4 a district court citing Southland Ice as authority approved of the exchange of $50,000 in new notes and
3000 shares of new voting stock in satisfaction of a loan of $252,000.5 In
addressing the Southwest issue the court stated, "the issuance of the mortgage
to ...[the old corporation's creditor] constituted the assumption of a portion
of the old mortgage, and as such ... is to be disregarded insofar as determining
whether the acquisition was 'solely for [the new corporation's] voting stock'."66
Before concluding the probable validity of substituting old liabilities for
behalf of the creditors as a group. In such case the assets are treated as being held in "trust"
for the old corporation so that upon a transfer by the committee to a new corporation, the
new corporation is treated as making the acquisition from the old in compliance with the
statutory requirement. See, e.g., Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52, 56, 1955-1
U.S.T.C. 19109 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955) (Tax Court correctly held that
the liquidating directors served merely as a "conduit" through which title passed to the new
corporation), Roosevelt Hotel Co., 13 T.C. 599 (1949) (liquidating trustee held the property
of the old corporation for four years before transfer to the new corporation nonetheless treated
the new corporation as acquiring the assets from the old corporation).
58. 15 T.C. at 154.
59. 200 F2d 552, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. 19140 (6th Cir. 1953).
60. Id. at 556, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. at ff9141.
61. 5 T.C. 842 (1945).
62. Id. at 844-45.
63. Id. at 847. (emphasis added).
64. 174 F. Supp. 702, 1959-2 U.S.T.C. 19548 (S.D. Me. 1959).
65. The district court held, however, that the transaction failed to qualify as a reorganization since the judicial xequirement of continuity of interest was violated in that the 3000 shares
of stock received by the creditor were immediately sold to a third party in pursuance of the
plan of reorganization. Id. at 710.
66. Id. at 709, 1959-2 U.S.T.C. at f73,339 (emphasis added).
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scaled down new liabilities plus new voting stock, note should be taken of
Helvering v. Cement Investors Inc., 7 a decision antedating each of the cases in
this area referred to above. In Cement Investors bondholders received $400
principal amount of new bonds and twenty shares of new voting stock for each
$1000 old bond exchanged.61 As part of the plan, old stockholders surrendered
their shares for warrants to purchase new voting stock. On these facts the
Supreme Court held that it was "plain from Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp. [that the transaction did not qualify as a "C" reorganization in
that] the assets of the old companies were not acquired in exchange 'solely'
for voting stock of the new company, since income bonds and warrants were
also issued." 69
The issuance of new warrants for old common stock clearly violated the
solely for voting stock restriction imposed for validation as a "C" reorganization.70 However the Court's inclusion of income bonds as a disqualifying factor
might be totally interpreted as disqualifying any assumption that substitutes
new bonds for corresponding old bonds. Restricting the language to the facts,
the decision could alternatively be read only to disqualify the substitution of
old bonds for a lesser principal amount of new bonds plus new stock. As indicated by the cases previously discussed, the actual interpretation given has been
to simply ignore the reference to substituted bonds as a disqualifying factor.
This precedent is unsettling because the Supreme Court has demonstrated that
it is not above undoing years of reorganizations based upon what it later decides
to be the proper interpretation of the Code, as in United States v. Hendler.71
PrincipalAmount is Changed but Payment is Made
by the Acquired Corporation
Where the plan of reorganization determines the nature and amount of the
acquired corporation's liabilities, one method of avoiding the assumption of
liabilities problems is for the acquired corporation to discharge such liabilities
out of its own assets rather than transferring them to the acquiring corporation.
The Tax Court approved this procedure in Southland Ice Co." In this case, the
acquired corporation paid dissenting bondholders cash to the extent of twenty
percent of the face value of their bonds. The Tax Court explained that the
solely for voting stock requirement meant, "that whatever property is acquired
must be paid for by the transferee in its voting stock, and nothing else, [but
does not require] that only voting stock can be received by any of those entitled
to participate."73 From a policy standpoint, the court pointed out that the
67. 316 U.S. 527, 1942-2 U.S.T.C. 9513 (1942).
68.

Commissioner v. Cement Investors, 122 F.2d 380, 1941-2 U.S.T.C. ff9614 (10th Cir.

1941).
69. 316 U.S. 527, 530, 1942-2 U.S.T.C. 10,192 (1942).
70. Helvering v. Southwest Consol. Corp., 315 U.S. 194 at 200-01, 1942-1 U.S.T.C.
(1942).
71.
text.

303 U.S. 564, 1938-1 U.S.T.C.

9248

9215 (1938). See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying

72. 5 T.C. 842 (1945).
73. Id. at 848.
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danger implicit in Southwest did not carry over to the case of discharge of
liabilities out of the acquired corporation's assets, because while
there is no apparent limitation on the amount a corporation might bor-,
row in the security of its property... the preliminary withdrawal of a
portion of the transferor corporation's property from the total to be
transferred . . . is necessarily limited by the express requirement that,
whatever remains to be transferred include substantially all the transferor's properties.7 4

74. Id. at 850. The cited language of the Southland Ice opinion implies that Southwest's
proscription of the acquiring corporation's assumption of a liability incurred by the acquired
corporation in contemplation of a reorganization is made necessary by the fact that there is
"no apparent limitation" upon the amount the acquired corporation might otherwise borrow
in such a transaction. The court's concern over this apparent opportunity for abuse was Wisplaced, however, since such an acquisition of borrowed funds in itself creates a new asset of
the acquired corporation that will be subject to the "substantially all" requirement of
§368(a)(1)(C).
The Service has ruled that retention of assets by the acquired corporation will be measured
against the "substantially all" criterion on the bases of the nature of the assets retained, the
purpose of their retention, and the amount retained. Rev. Rul. 57-518, 1957-2 C.B. 253. Within
this framework, the nature and purpose for retention of assets are clearly more significant than
the amount retained. In Milton Smith, 84 B.T.A. 702 (1936), a retention by the acquired
corporation of 29% of its assets was held to be within the "substantially all" requirement since
the assets were liquid and approximately equalled the outstanding liabilities of the acquired
corporation, although the court warned that a different result would follow if the amount
retained was clearly in excess of the amount needed to liquidate liabilities. The Smith decision, by way of dicta, indicated that there would probably be a limit to the extent to which
the acquired corporation could retain assets even though the retention corresponded to the
amount of outstanding liabilities of the acquired corporation, suggesting that if liabilities
amounted to 90% of the assets the retention of such 90% "might . . . not come within the
intent of Congress in its use of the words 'substantially all'." Id. at 705.
The Service, on a more conservative note, has indicated that requests for rulings on the
"substantially all" requirement would be considered where at least 90% of the fair market
value of the net assets and at least 70% of the fair market value of the gross assets determined
immediately prior to the reorganization are transferred to the acquiring corporation. Rev.
Pxoc. 74-26, 1974-2 C.B. 478, 479. In determining the amount of assets held immediately prior
to the reorganization, payments made in contemplation of the reorganization (e.g. payments
to dissenters or redemptions) will be added back and considered as held immediately prior to
the reorganization. Id.
The Service may, in the alternative, challenge a substantial retention of assets on the
basis of continuity of interest. The Regulations allude to this possibility stating: "[T]hough
such an assumption does not prevent an exchange from being solely for voting stock for the
purposes of the definition of a reorganization contained in section 368(a)(1)(C), it may in
some cases, however, so alter the character of the transaction as to place the transaction outside the purposes and assumptions of the reorganization provisions." Reg. §1.368-2(d)(1).
If the assets of the acquired corporation are predominantly owned by creditors and the
acquiring corporation assumes the liabilities of the acquired corporation, then even though
the shareholders of the acquired corporation received solely voting stock of the acquiring
corporation in exchange for their interest in the acquired corporation, it can still be said that
the creditors, who in reality were the substantial owners of the acquired corporation failed to
receive an "interest in the affairs of the transferee which represent[s] a material part of the
value of the transfered assets," as required by Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 878,
1936-1 US.T.C. 119015 (1936). See note 5 supra.
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The Tax Court added a new dimension to its reasoning in Southland Ice in
Roosevelt Hotel Co. 5 In Roosevelt Hotel, dissenting bondholders were paid
fifteen percent of the face value of their bonds from a fund set up by the
acquiring corporation. This fund included both amounts borrowed by the
acquiring corporation and cash that had previously been an asset of the
acquired corporation. The Tax Court acknowledged that the acquiring corporation's discharge of the dissenting bondholders' modified liabilities would
violate Southwest, but avoided this difficulty by treating the transaction as if
the acquiring corporation had never received the cash that was paid to the
dissenting bondholders. Because the acquired corporation had transferred sufficient cash to discharge the dissenting bondholders' claims, this constructive
payment by the acquired corporation preserved the "C" reorganization.-O
Conspicuously absent from the Roosevelt Hotel opinion was any reference
to the earlier decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in Sacramento Medico
Dental Building Co. v. Commissioner.7 On facts parallel to Roosevelt Hotel,
the Sacramento Medico Board did not constructively apply a more than adequate fund of the acquired corporation's cash to the payment of scaled down
liabilities with the result that the transaction failed to qualify as a "C" reorganization. Although the Tax Court would probably follow Roosevelt
Hotel78 it seems to make sense, in view of this unanswered inconsistency, to
structure the transaction so that payments from the acquired corporation are
made prior to the transfer of assets to the acquiring corporation.
OtherModifications
Several decisions have allowed assumption of liabilities, the amount of
which are fixed in the reorganization but do not represent an adjustment of a
principal amount. The Service has recently adopted the position that the
acquiring corporation can assume the obligation of paying the expenses of a
"C" reorganization even though the amount of this obligation is determined by
the reorganization."" This position had been consistently maintained by the
75. 13 T.C. 399 (1949).
76. The court stated, "To the extent necessary to meet the claims of nonassenting bondholders, we may regard a part of the property as set aside for that purpose and not acquired
by [the acquiring corporation]." Id. at 408.
77. 47 B.T.A. 315 (1942).
78. The Tax Court reached the same result on similar facts in Westfir Lumber Co., 7 T.C.
1014 (1946), and apparently has chosen not to follow SacramentoMedico.
79. Rev. Rul. 67-275, 1967-2 C.B. 142, held that the expense of an acquiring corporation
registering its own shares to be distributed to the acquired corporation was properly attributable to the acquiring corporation and therefore did not constitute a distribution of "other
property" to the acquired corporation. The ruling stopped short of permitting assumption of
the general expenses involved in a "C" reorganization. Rev. Rul. 73-54, 1973-1 C.B. 187, held
that the acquiring corporation's payment of, or assumption of, liability for the bona fide reorganization expenses attributable to the acquired corporation or its shareholders will not
defeat an otherwise valid reorganization under §368(a)(1)(B) or (C). Rev. Rul. 76-365, 1976-2
C.B. 110, held that the acquired corporation could assume the liability to pay the expenses
incurred to investigate the desirability of acquisition offers made by the acquiring corporation
and by five other corporations.
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Tax Court o on the ground that although such payments represent part of the
cost of acquiring the acquired corporation's property, they do not "go indirectly to the old corporation or its creditors." 81
The Tax Court has also permitted the practice of predating substituted
securities in those situations in which the acquiring corporation replaces bonds
of the acquired corporation with new bonds bearing a lower interest rate. 2
The practical effect of this practice is to replace the interest obligation of the
old corporation with a reduced interest obligation of the new corporation for
a period of time antecedent to the reorganization. As a result, even if the new
bonds are of the same principal amount as the old, there is an assumption of a
scaled down interest obligation the amount of which is fixed by the reorganization. The Tax Court has justified this approach on the ground that the new
bondholders receive payment in the status of bondholders of the new corporation.83 This distinction, however, ignores the fact that during the running of the
interest period, neither the bonds of the new corporation4 nor the new corporation itself85 are in existence.
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

The operative provisions providing for nonrecognition are available only
upon a determination that the definitional requirements of a reorganization
have been satisfied. 8 For this reason uncertainty regarding the scope of assumption of liabilities permitted by the definition of a "C" reorganization undermines the foundation upon which the structure of the reorganization is
fashioned. This result poses a threat both to the Commissioner and to the
taxpayer. If a liability assumed was not a liability of the acquired corporation,
then the assumption will constitute consideration of the acquiring corporation
other than voting stock. As a result section 368(a)(2)(B)8 7 will be triggered, and
if the total amount of the liabilities assumed or acquired exceeds twenty percent of the gross assets of the acquired corporation, the transaction will become
a taxable exchange."8 If the tax year of such an exchange is an open one8 9 the
80. New Jersey Mortgage & Title Co., 3 T.C. 1277 (1944); AIcazar Hotel, Inc., 1 T.C.
872 (1943); Claridge Apartments Co., I T.C. 163 (1942), rev'd on other grounds, 138 F.2d 962,
1943-2 U.S.T.C. 119663 (7th Cir. 1943), rev'd on other grounds, 323 U.S. 141, 1944-2 U.S.T.C.
19532 (1944).
81. Claridge Apts. Co., I T.C. 163, 170 (1942).
82. See New Jersey Mortgage & Title Co., 3 T.C. 1277 (1944). Under the plan of reorganization new bonds were substituted for old bonds at the same principal amount but paying a lower rate of interest and predated seven months prior to the reorganization. In
Southland Ice Co., 5 T.C. 842 (1945), old bonds were exchanged for new at the same rate of
interest but the new bonds were income bonds and were predated 12 months prior to the
reorganization and 11 months prior to the date of incorporation of the acquiring corporation.
83. New Jersey Mortgage &Title Co., 3 T.C. 1277, 1286 (1944).
84. Id. at 1280, 1283.
85. Southland Ice Co., 5 T.C. 842, 846 (1945).
86. Commissioner v. Turnbow, 286 F.2d 669, 1961-1 U.S.T.C. 19148 (9th Cir. 1961), aff'd,
368 U.S. 387, 1962-1 U.S.T.C. 119104 (1962).
87. I.R.C. §868(a)(2)(B).
88. However, if the acquiring corporation acquires at least 80% of the gross assets of the
acquired corporation, then redemption for cash by the acquiring corporation of nonpartidpat-
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Commissioner may assess deficiencies: (1) against the acquired corporation,
reflecting the realized gain upon the exchange of appreciated assets that was
not formerly recognized by reason of section 361, 90 and (2) against the shareholders of the acquired corporation as reflecting the realized gain on the exchange of appreciated old stock or securities for new stock or securities that was
not recognized by reason of sections 354 and 356. 91 If the tax year of the exchange has closed the Commissioner stands to lose since taxpayers will claim a
fair market value basis for their new stock and the new corporation will claim
a fair market value basis in the old assets.9 2 The Commissioner may recover at
least part of the tax loss attributable to the shareholders, becasue in view of the
mitigation provisions of section 1312(7)(B)(i), (C)(ii), 93 shareholders may elect
not to assert that their prior exchanges were taxable. 94 However, the mitigation
provisions will not apply to the acquiring corporation thereby creating a
permanent deferral of taxes. 95
PROPOSED SOLUTION

The current state of uncertainty regarding application of the assumption of
liabilities test announced in Southwest, when viewed from the perspective of
the consequences resulting from failure to satisfy the section 368(a)(1)(C) definitional requirements, presents circumstances quite similar to the aftermath of
Hendler96 This situation benefits neither the Commissioner nor the tax-

ing creditors of the acquired corporation will be permitted within the boot limitations of
I.R.C. §368(a)(2)(B). Rev. Rul. 73-102, 1973-1 C.B. 186; Rev. Rul. 63-100, 1963-1 C.B. 255.
89. See I.R.C. §6501(a).
90. Id. §361.
91. Id. §§354, 356.
92. Reg. §1.1032-1(d).
93. I.R.C. §1312(7)(B)(i), (C)(ii).
94. Since the availability to the Commissioner of I.R.C. §1312(7) as a circumstance of
adjustment is limited by the requirement that the taxpayer maintain an inconsistent position
(§1311(b)(1), Reg. §1.1311(b)-1(c)(2) (example)), a taxpayer may elect to adhere to his original
(incorrect) position that the earlier exchange was nontaxable so as to prevent the assessment
of interest and penalties during the intervening years. I.R.C. §1314(a).
95. This fact is illustrated by the following example: Suppose in 1956 New Corporation
acquired assets from Old Corporation having a fair market value of 100 and a basis of 30.
Assuming the acquisition was treated as occurring in a "C" reorganization, New would have a
30 carryover basis under I.R.C. §362(b)(2) and no gain under §1032(a). In 1978 New sold the
assets for 100 and reported no gain under the theory that the 1956 acquisition was not a
reorganization since liabilities were improperly assumed under the Southwest decision and as
a result the assets had a §1012 cost basis. The Commissioner asserts a deficiency against New
and a final determination is reached holding that the property was in fact acquired in a
taxable transaction. Since New is the taxpayer who is subject to the determination but New's
treatment was not erroneous (since §1032(a) would prevent New's recognition of gain whether
or not the acquisition was pursuant to a reorganization), §1312(7) does not apply. §1312(3)(B)
would not apply unless New and Old were affiliated corporations, §1313(c)(7), and in this
example would not apply even if the corporations were affiliated since §1311(b)(2)(A) is not
satisfied. As a result, New and Old corporations both escape taxation on the 1956 exchange
and New's stepped up basis permanently defers any recognition.
96. 303 U.S. 564, 1938-1 U.S.T.C. 99215 (1938). See text accompanying notes 10-12 supra.
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payer.9 7 It therefore seems appropriate to consider the alternatives for resolving
the ambiguities that the Southwest opinion has spawned.
One solution would be for the Supreme Court to spell out the specific types
of transactions that will and will not violate the Southwest doctrine. This
solution is unlikely because the normal practice of the Court is to studiously
avoid making precedent not necessary for a resolution of the case.98 Therefore,
any development of black and white rules by the Court promises to be a long
and painful process. An even stronger mitigating factor against such an approach is that rule making would attack the symptoms rather than the disease.
The root of the Southwest problem is that the Court created a superfluous
judicial doctrine that is neither necessary to achieve the congressional purposes implicit in the reorganizations provisions nor required by the literal
language of the Code.
A Considerationof the CongressionalPurposes
The reorganization provisions reflect a congressional determination that
certain corporate transactions, by virtue of constituting merely a change in the
form of a continuing investment, do not represent an appropriate occasion to
impose a tax,99 notwithstanding the fact that exchanges otherwise taxable under
section 1001100 have occurred. The term "reorganization" first appeared in the
Revenue Act of 1918,101 although it was not defined until the Revenue Act of
1921.02 As previously indicated, 0 3 this early definition imposed no restrictions
on the nature of the acquiring corporation's consideration, 04 compelling the
courts to construct judicial stopgaps to prevent obvious abuses.1 05
In drafting the Revenue Act of 1934 Congress embarked upon a comprehensive effort to increase revenue through the legislative elimination of existing
avenues of tax avoidance. 06 As a part of this effort, Congress established the
Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means Relative to Methods of
Preventing the Avoidance and Evasion of the Internal Revenue Laws. One of
the conclusions reached in the preliminary report of this Subcommittee was
that the corporate reorganization provisions constituted "one of the most pre-

97. See notes 84-95 supra and accompanying text.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 846 (1911).
See H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 13 (1934).
I.R.C. §1001.
Revenue Act of 1918, §202(b), 40 Stat. 1060.
Revenue Act of 1921, §202(c)(2), 42 Stat. 230.

103. See notes 4-5 supraand accompanying text.
104. Congressman Green of Iowa made the following observation regarding the Revenue
Act of 1921 reorganization definition: "There is no more frequent or common cause of evasion
at the present time than the provisions of the present law with reference to reorganization of
corporations. They are so extremely broad and so loose that you could drive a four-horse
team through them." 65 CONG. REc. 2899 (1924).
105. See note 5 supra.
106. The House Report stated with respect to the Revenue Act of 1934: "The primary

purpose of the bill is to increase the revenue by preventing tax avoidance." H.R. REP. No.
704, 75d Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1934).
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valent methods of tax avoidance,"' 10 7 a finding that the subcommittee recommended should be remedied by completely abolishing the reorganization provisions.'0 8 Opponents of such a drastic course of action, pointing out that the

reorganization provisions when applicable prevented recognition of loss as well
as gain, 0 9 argued that the initial result of the recommended abolition would
be an onslaught of taxable reorganizations for the purpose of recognizing paper
losses." 0 Accordingly, the final conclusion of the committee was that "the wiser
policy is to amend the provisions drastically to stop the known cases of tax
avoidance rather than to eliminate the sections completely.""' Acting upon
this recommendation the House version of the Revenue Act of 1934 would have
eliminated acquisition of stock["B"] reorganizations, and acquisition of asset
["C"] reorganizations so that the only form of acquisitive reorganization would
have been the statutory merger or consolidation - the "A" reorganization.172
The Senate Ways and Means Committee concurred with the House with
regard to policy, but disagreed as to approach, stating:
[The] committee is in complete agreement with the purposes of the
House bill which aim at tax-avoidance schemes in this connection. However, some modifications are recommended in order to bring about a
more uniform application of the provisions in all 48 of the States. Not
all of the states have adopted statutes for mergers or consolidations; and,
moreover, a corporation of one State cannot ordinarily merge with a
corporation of another State. The committee believes it is desireable to
permit reorganizations in such cases, with restrictions designed to prevent tax avoidance. Consequently, the committee recommends the insertion in the House bill of an addition to the definition of the term
'reorganization' as follows: (B) the acquisition by one corporation in
exchange solely for its voting stock: of at least 80 per centum of the
voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of
all other classes of stock of another corporation; or substantially all of the
properties of another corporation. The committee believes that these
transactions, when carried out as prescribed in this amendment, are
themselves sufficiently similar
3 to mergers and consolidations as to be entitled to similartreatment."
107. Preliminary Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means Relative to Methods of Preventing the Avoidance and Evasion of the Internal Revenue Laws, 73d
Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1934).
108. Id. at 9. The subcommittee estimated that the abolition of the reorganization provisions would save the Treasury $18 million annually. Id.
109. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§354(a)(1), 356(c), 361(a), (b)(2).
110. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 (1934).
111. Id.at 13.
112. Id. at 14. The policy behind elimination of the "B"and "C" forms of reorganizations
as proposed by the House version of the Revenue Act of 1934 stems from the fact that under
then existing law-Revenue Act of 1932, §112(i)(l)-the acquisition of a majority of the
total number of shares or substantially all of the stock of the acquired corporation in itself
satisfied the statutory reorganization requirements. Since there were no statutory restrictions
on the consideration to be used for such an acquisition it was possible for a transaction to
literally qualify although lacking organic resemblance to the change in form conceptualized
within statutory mergers and consolidations. The compromise solution was to retain the "B"
and "C" forms but impose a "solely for voting stock" requirement. Id.
113. S. REP.No. 558, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess. 16 (1934) (emphasis added).
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The Senate recommendations were adopted,114 and the resulting legislation
provided a framework for consideration requirements in acquisitive reorganizations that remains to the present. 115 The genesis of the "B" and "C" forms of
reorganization was the desire to create an alternative to the "A" reorganization
in those situations for which no state statute was available, but in which the
transaction was "sufficiently similar... as to be entitled to similar treatment,"
so it follows that the congressional intent would be furthered by interpreting
the statutory consideration requirements in such a manner as to permit the
use of a "C" reorganization to achieve the same types of generic changes when
proceding under section 368(a)(1)(C) 1 0 as could have been achieved had section
868(a)(1)(A)117 been available. Since there is no restriction imposed upon modification of the terms of the acquired corporation's liabilities in the case of an
"A" reorganization, it follows from a policy standpoint that such a restriction
should not be judicially imposed upon "C" reorganizations unless clearly mandated by the language of the statute.
A Considerationof the Statutory Scheme
Under section 357(a) and (b)118 assumption of liabilities in corporate reorganizations does not result in recognition of gain by the acquired corporation
unless in view of the circumstances in which the liability was assumed, it appears that the principal purpose for such assumption was to avoid federal income tax"19 or was not for a bona fide business purpose.1 20 The predecessor of
section 357 was originally enacted as part of the Internal Revenue Code of
2
1939.121 At the same time, Congress responded to the Hendler2 decision by
amending the definition of a "C" reorganization providing that "in determining whether the exchange is solely for voting stock the assumption by the
acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, or the fact that property is
1 23
acquired subject to a liability, shall be disregarded."
The committee reports regarding this modification of the definition of a "C"
reorganization state that such assumed liabilities are to be disregarded "whether
or not under the provisions of subsection (k) [now section 357(b)] the transferor
is considered to have received money on account of the assumption of a liabil-

114. See Revenue Act of 1934, §112(g)(1)(B), 48 Stat. 705.
115. See I.R.C. §368(a)(1)(A), (B), (C). The consideration provisions currently in effect
are identical to the provisions of the Revenue Act of 1954, §112(g)(1)(A), (B) with the exception of §568(a)(2)(B) permitting limited use of boot in "C" reorganizations, and the
parenthetical amendments to §568(a)(1)(B) and (C) permitting use of a parent corporation's
stock in triangular reorganizations. See note 6 supra.

116. I.R.C. §568(a)(1)(C).
117. Id. §568(a)(1)(A).
118. Id. §557(a), (b).
119. Id. §357(b)(1)(A).

120. Id. §357(b)(1)(B).
121. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §112(k), 53 Stat. 40 (now I.R.C. §357).
122. United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 1938-1 U.S.T.C. 19215 (1938). See notes 10-14
and 20-30 supra and accompanying text.
123. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, l12(g)(1)(C), 53 Stat. 40 (now I.R.C. §357).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 3

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII

1 4

Thus the committee reports indicate that even if the liabilities assumed
by the acquiring corporation were created for the purpose of avoiding federal
income tax or were not bona fide business liabilities, this fact would not prevent qualification as a "C" reorganization. Such liabilities would nevertheless
be disregarded in determining if the "solely for voting stock" requirement was
met. It seems transparent that if Congress intended, in determing the existence
of a "C" reorganization, to disregard liabilities contrived for the principal
purpose of avoiding federal income tax then a modification of a liability in
accordance with bona fide business needs was a fortiori intended to be likewise
disregarded. It is apparent that the Southwest decision, in disqualifying the
transaction as a reorganization, manifestly failed to recognize the statutory
scheme under which Congress chose to sanction spurious liabilities by penalizing, under section 357(b)125 the transferor rather than poisoning the reorganization.
A statutory solution therefore seems to be in order. Such a solution could
be effected by amending section 368(a)(1)(C) to read, "but in determining
whether the exchange is solely for stock the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, or the fact that property acquired is subject to
a liability, (without regard to modifications of such liabilities), shall be disregarded." (proposed amendment italicized.)
The proposed change would permit modifications of liabilities required by
the business exigencies of the individual case. It would not be an invitation to
modifications not required by bona fide business needs or for the purpose of
evading federal income tax since the section 357(b) penalty is not altered.
ity." 2

STRUCTURING THE "C"

REORGANIZATION UNDER CURRENT LAW

The merits of the Southwest decision are largely academic to the practitioner who must construct corporate transactions under the constraints of the
law as it exists today. Consideration of the presently available options therefore
is in order. In structuring a "C" reorganization,126 selection of the party upon
which responsibility to discharge the acquired corporation's liabilities will rest
raises significant tax considerations in addition to the Southwest issue. The
ideal solution, while avoiding challenge under Southwest, must achieve tax
efficiency in other respects as well.
124.
125.

H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1939).
I.R.C. §857(b)(1) (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §112(k)) is penal in that if a

single liability is assumed for the proscribed purpose then all liabilities assumed will, without
regard to the purpose of their assumption, be treated as the receipt of money, causing realized
gain to be recognized under §361(b)(1)(B) of the 1954 Code. Reg. §1.357-1(c) (1954).
126. The discussion in the text assumes that the decision has been made to reorganize
under §368(a)(l)(C). Such a decision might result from the unavailability of an applicable
state statute; e.g., in the case of acquiring a corporation organized outside of the United
States or the desire to avoid certain provisions of state law that would be applicable under a
statutory merger or consolidation; e.g., assumption of unknown or contingent liabilities that
might be statutorily assumed in an "A" reorganization but avoidable in an acquisition of
assets under §368(a)(I)(C). While this Note is primarily concerned with the options available
in "C" reorganizations, the significance of the initial choice of method for reorganization
should not be overlooked.
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Retention of Liabilities by the Acquired Corporation
If the acquired corporation retains its liabilities, it may effectuate their discharge either by transferring less than all of its assets to the acquiring corporation and distributing the retained assets to its creditors or by transferring all
of its assets to the acquiring corporation and distributing stock of the acquiring
corporation to its creditors. 1 27 Since in either case the liabilities of the acquired
corporation are not assumed by the acquiring corporation, the Southwest
complication is completely foreclosed. The latter approach has the added advantage of assuring satisfaction of the "substantially all" requirement of section 368(a)(1)(C) 12 8 since the acquiring corporation acquires all of the acquired
corporation's assets. If the liabilities of the acquired corporation are excessive
the latter approach may insulate the transaction from a challenge based upon
lack of continuity of interest. 29 An obvious disadvantage of the latter approach
is its dependence upon the willingness of the acquired corporation's creditors
to accept stock of the acquiring corporation in satisfaction of their claims.
The satisfaction of the acquired corporation's liabilities with either its retained appreciated assets or with stock 30 of the acquiring corporation will
result in recognition of "Davis's ' gain" by the acquired corporation. For this
reason, in those circumstances in which the acquired corporation's creditors are
willing to accept stock of the acquiring corporation, it may be desirable to have
32
the distribution of such stock made directly from the acquiring corporation,S
although such an option will again make Southwest considerations relevant.
Assumption of Liabilitiesby the Acquiring Corporation
Discharge of the acquired corporation's liabilities by the acquiring corporation is a second alternative. Although assumption of liabilities by the acquiring
corporation places this alternative within the ambit of the Southwest decision,
Southwest will impose its constraints only upon those cases in which there is
no tangible boot and with respect to which the assumed liabilities exceed
twenty percent of the gross assets of the acquired corporation. This result
127. Obviously a combination of these two approaches is also possible.

128. I.R.C. §368(a)(1)(C). A definitional requirement of the "C"reorganization is that the
acquiring corporation acquire "substantially all of the properties" of the acquired corporation.
See note 74 supra.
129. See note 74 supra.
130. See Rev. Rul. 70-271, 1970-1 C.B. 166. The Service held that a discharge of a liability
of the acquired corporation to an unrelated third party (Situation 1) or to a shareholder of

the acquired corporation (Situation 2) effected by the acquired corporation's transfer of
shares of the acquiring corporation's stock would result in recognition of gain to the

acquired corporation to the extent that the acquired corporation's liability discharged by the
exchange exceeded the §358(a)(1) substituted basis in the acquiring corporation's stock. Section
361(a) does not apply to this exchange since the acquired corporation exchanges property but
does not receive in return stock or securities of another party to the reorganization.
131. See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. f9509 (1962).
132. See I.R.C. §1032(a) providing, "No gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation

on the receipt of money or other property in exchange for stock." The Service held that if an
acquiring corporation exchanges its own stock in satisfaction of assumed liabilities of the
acquired corporation no gain or loss would be recognized. Rev. Rul. 75-450, 1975-2 C.B. 329.
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follows from the fact that where the acquiring corporation transfers boot, all
assumed liabilities will be automatically treated as money for the purposes of
section 368(a)(2)(B),1 3 making consideration of Southwest irrelevant. If the
acquiring corporation transfers no tangible boot, but the liabilities assumed are
less than twenty percent of the acquired corporation's gross assets, then even if
the assumed liabilities are treated as "other property" they will be permitted
by the section 368(a)(2)(B) boot relaxation rule.13 4 Thus, consideration of
Southwest would become unimportant. Where there is no tangible boot, but
liabilities exceed twenty percent of gross assets, Southwest comes to the fore. If
a single liability is under Southwest treated as "other property," then in accordance with section 368(a)(2)(B) all of the assumed liabilities will be treated
as money for purposes of the boot relaxation rule and the transaction will be
disqualified as a "C" reorganization. Liabilities so assumed may be discharged
in exchange for either property or for stock of the acquiring corporation. 135
If the acquiring corporation must sell assets of the acquired corporation in
order to discharge the assumed liabilities, the acquiring corporation will recognize Davis gain by virtue of the carryover basis in the acquired assets. To the
extent that liabilities of the acquired corporation are to be satisfied from appreciated assets of the acquired corporation, it may be advantageous for the
acquired corporation to retain assets. Although the Davis gain is identical, the
acquired corporation's exchange of assets for liabilities subsequent to the reorganization will insulate the acquiring corporation from the earnings and
37
profits 36 generated by the exchange.
Assumption of Liabilitiesby the Acquired Corporation'sShareholders
The acquired corporation's shareholders constitute a third source from
which the acquired corporation's obligations could be discharged. Because
there is no assumption of liabilities by the acquiring corporation, Southwest
considerations are not applicable. Since this approach does not require retention of assets by the acquired corporation the "substantially all" requirement
is also satisfied. Assumption of liabilities by the acquired corporation's shareholders will not create "Old Colony Trust 38 gain" to the acquired corporation
since the assumption will be treated as a contribution to the capital of the

133.
134.
135.
136.

I.R.C. §368(a)(2)(B).
See note 88 supra.
See note 132 supra.
See I.R.C. §312(f).

137. See Rev. Rul. 68-358, 1968-2 C.B. 156, in which the Service held that the §381 and
§382 carryover of corporate attributes in a "C" reorganization will transpire at the time that
the acquired corporation transfers substantially all its assets to the acquiring corporation, notwithstanding the fact that the acquired corporation remains in existence, provided the
principal purpose of the reorganization was not the evasion or avoidance of income tax as
described in §269. Accordingly, it appears that as long as the principal purpose of the reorganization is not evasion or avoidance of income tax within the contemplation of §269, the
fact that the acquired corporation is kept in existence to secure a post-reorganization tax
benefit should not be subject to challenge.

138.

Old Colony Trust Co., 279 U.S. 716, 1 U.S.T.C. f1408 (1929).
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acquired corporation under section 118(a).139 The assumption will constitute a
capital expenditure of the acquired corporation's shareholders, with section
263(a)140 increasing the basis in their stock to the extent of the liabilities assumed.142 This step-up in basis will be reflected in the substituted basis of the
acquiring corporation's stock under section 358(a)(1).142
A danger inherent in this approach is that the Commissioner will characterize the acquired corporation's shareholders as a mere conduit for payment
of the assumed liabilities. The acquired corporation would therefore be treated
as discharging its own obligations in exchange for the acquiring corporation's
stock, resulting in a loss of the stepped-up basis to the acquired corporation's
shareholders and in recognition of "Davis gain" at the corporate level.
The acquired corporation's shareholders would be designated as a conduit
in those situations in which such shareholders are required by the plan of reorganization to use a specific fund or the specific assets transferred by the
acquired corporation in satisfaction of the acquired corporation's liabilities.'139. I.R.C. §118(a). See Rev. Rut. 70-271, 1970-1 C.B. 166; Rev. Rul. 67-411, 1967-2 C.B.
124.
140. I.R.C. §263(a); Reg. §l.263(a)-2(f).
141. Rev. Rul. 70-271, 1970-1 C.B. 166, 167; Rev. Rul. 67-411, 1962-2 C.B. 124.
142. I.R.C. §358(a)(1).
143. The principal case in support of such a restructuring is Minnesota Tea Co. v.
Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 1938-1 U.S.T.C. ff9050 (1938). Minnesota Tea involved a reorganization, under the Revenue Act of 1928, in which the acquired corporation distributed cash and
stock of the acquiring corporation to the acquired corporation's shareholders pursuant to a
written agreement executed by the shareholders stating that "in consideration of such distribution ... [the shareholders] agree to pay all the corporate debts of the Minnesota Tea
Company." At issue was whether the transfer of cash was "distributed" to the shareholders
within the meaning of §112(d)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1928 (now §361(b)(1)(A)) providing
that if the acquired corporation receives property from the acquiring corporation that is not
permitted to be received without recognition of gain, then notwithsanding such receipt gain
will not be recognized if the acquired corporation distributes such property in pursuance of
the plan of reorganization. The Supreme Court noted that, "payment of the debts by
petitioner, if made directly by petitioner to the creditors, would not have been a distribution
under the statute; for that contemplates a distribuion to stockholders and not payment to
creditors ....And, obviously, this is the effect of what was done, although circuitously." 302
U.S.at 612-13. The Court then concluded: "A given result at the end of a straight path is not
made a different result reached by following a devious path. The preliminary distribution to
the stockholders was a meaningless and unnecessary incident in the transmission of the fund
to the creditors, all intended to come to their hands, so transparently artificial that further
discussion would be a needless waste of time. The relation of the stockholders to the matter
was that of a mere conduit." 302 U.S. at 613-14.
In Rev. Rul. 70-271, 1970-1 C.B. 167, Situation (3), the Service held that where the acquiring corporation after transferring its assets to the acquired corporation distributed the
acquiring corporation's stock to the acquired corporation's shareholders who "simultaneously
assumed" the liabilities of the acquired corporation, such assumption would be viewed as a
capital contribution resulting in an increase in the basis in the stock of the acquired corporation equal to the amount of the liability assumed. In view of Minnesota Tea this result
seems surprising. The Service distinguished Rev. Rul. 70-271 in Rev. Rul. 75-450, 1975-2 C.B.
328. The latter ruling involved a "C" reorganization under which the acquired corporation's
shareholders assumed the obligation of the acquired corporation Y to pay 50 shares of the
acquiring corporation's X's stock to a named individual. The ruling states that: "Pursuant to,
and as a condition for, X's consummating the transaction, Y's shareholders assumed Y's
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However, the Service has held the conduit characterization to be inapplicable
to a situation in which the acquired corporation's shareholders were not required to satisfy assumed liabilities from any designated assets or fund even
though the assumption of the acquired corporation's liabilities was simultaneous with the distribution of the acquiring corporation's stock. 144 To prevent a restructuring of the transaction by the Commissioner, a corporation
choosing this approach should obviously avoid any direction in the plan of
reorganization mandating payment of assumed liabilities out of the acquiring
corporation's stock, and prudence would dictate that the acquired corporation's shareholders retain the acquiring corporation's stock for a reasonable
period of time to avoid the appearance of a prearranged plan. 145
CONCLUSION

Under the current state of the law, the tax planner is well advised to treat
with reservation modifications in the liabilities of the acquired corporation to
be assumed by the acquiring corporation in pursuance of a "C" reorganization.
It has been noted that certain modifications are safer than others, and that
assumption by parties, other than the acquiring corporation, will avoid the
Southwest issue. Pending a legislative solution, planning in this area promises
to remain an uncertain exercise, but awareness of the pitfalls should make the
sledding much easier.
DANIEL G. CALUGAR

obligation to pay 50 shares of the X stock received to a certain individual as a finder's fee in
connection with the transaction. The liability could only be satisfied with the X stock. The Y
shareholders satisfied this obligation by paying the 50 shares of the X stock they received when
Y was liquidated immediately after the reorganization pursuant to the plan." (emphasis
added).
The Service held that this transaction would be controlled by the Minnesota Tea decision
since the shareholders were in the position of a passive conduit in that they were legally
obligated to transfer shares of the acquiring corporation to the acquired corporation's
obligee. The Service went on to hold: "Situation (3) of Rev. Rul. 70-271 is distinguishable
from the instant case, since the shareholders in situation (3)did not assume the liability with

an obligation to satisfy it with assets received concurrently with the assumption as in the
instant case." (emphasis added).
These rulings indicate that a decidedly pro-taxpayer interpretation of Minnesota Tea is
taken by the Service, and that the concurrent assumption of liabilities of the acquired corporation upon a liquidation distribution of the acquired corporation will not result in characterization of the shareholders as a conduit under Minnesota Tea unless such shareholders are
legally committed to use specific assets to discharge the liabilities assumed.
144. Rev. Rul. 70-271, 1970-1 C.B. 166. See note 16 supra.
145. See note 26 supra.
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